How do we assess what we remember? Previous work on metacognition suggests that confidence judgments are more accurate when given after than before a response to a perceptual task. Here we present two experiments that investigate the influence of decision and response on metacognitive accuracy in a memory task so as to establish what kind of information people use to assess their memory content. Participants were asked to remember lists of words and then to decide which of two target words had previously been presented. In both experiments, participants rated their confidence either after or before the response. However, the experiments differed in the amount of information provided for confidence rating. In Experiment 1, before confidence rating, participants were either presented with both target words and asked to decide between them, or they were only presented with a cue (first letter of the subsequent target words). In Experiment 2, participants were always presented with a target word before confidence rating. The results of both experiments showed that although task accuracy correlated with confidence ratings in both conditions, this relationship was weaker when confidence was assessed before response to a memory task. We argue that metacognitive judgments are influenced by processing information that is not available at the time of primary response. We discuss the implications for theories of confidence and metacognition.
How do we assess what we perceive and remember? This question taps into the problem of metacognitive access to one's own cognitive states and processes. Multiple theories of metacognition and consciousness claim to provide explanation for how this access occurs (see, e.g., Baars, 1997; Cleeremans, 2011; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Fleming & Daw, 2017; Lau, 2008; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011) , however, they are often contradictory and the exact mechanism is still being debated. Here, we focus on the questions concerning what metacognitive judgments about one's knowledge or perceptual experience are based on (an issue that has been vividly discussed in decision models literature, see, e.g., Moran, Teodorescu, & Usher, 2015) and whether their mechanisms are the same for different types of content (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; McCurdy, Maniscalco, Metcalfe, Liu, de Lange, & Lau, 2013) . Specifically, we studied whether response in a memory task improves metacognition, as it has been shown in perceptual (Wierzchoń, Paulewicz, Asanowicz, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2014) and problem-solving tasks (Siedlecka, Paulewicz, & Wierzchoń, 2016) .
Despite the differences between assumed mechanisms, there is an agreement that accessibility can be inferred from metacognitive reports (e.g., Baars, 1997; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Lau, 2008; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012) . Commonly used quantified forms of those reports are ratings on subjective scales, such as the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), used to measure stimuli visibility (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) and confidence ratings (CR) that assess certainty in a stimulus-related decision (Tunney & Shanks, 2003) . The ratings are typically collected during forced-choice tasks (i.e., Type I tasks) such as perceptual discrimination or knowledge-based classification (e.g., Dienes & Seth, 2010; Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004) . Using the ratings (i.e., Type II measures), one can measure metacognitive accuracy that is the extent to which participants are aware of information they used for Type I response. Metacognitive accuracy is therefore measured as a relation between performance level in Type I task and subjective ratings (Norman, Price, & Jones, 2011; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010) .
The relation between information that underlies Type I response and metacognitive judgment is a subject of debate (e.g., Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; Wierzchoń, Paulewicz, Asanowicz, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2014) . One of especially interesting questions concerns the issue of whether metacognitive judgment reflects merely the stimulus-related signal (i.e., its strength) or is based on additional information. Theories of conscious access usually do not explicitly address this question, but the general assumption underlying signal detection-based approaches (e.g., Lau, 2008) or global availability theories (Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009) seems to be that Type I responses and metacognitive judgment are based on the same information. This issue has been also investigated in the field of confidence models. A distinction had been made between models assuming single information-collection stage and the ones based on a premise of dual information-collection stage (for a review see, e.g., Moran et al., 2015) . Single stage models assume that confidence is calculated on the same evidence that led to Type I response (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003; Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, 2009; Vickers & Lee, 1998) . Proponents of dual stage models challenge this assumption and claim that confidence results from a separate, postdecisional stage of evidence accumulation (e.g., the two-stage dynamic signal detection model, Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010 ; the collapsing confidence boundary model, Moran et al., 2015) . The assumption of an additional stage is supported by the finding that the time taken to rate one's confidence after Type I decision predicts reported confidence level. This suggests that confidence is still processed after Type I response had been given (Hilgenstock, Weiss, & Witte, 2014; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; Yu, Pleskac, & Zeigenfuse, 2015) . Also, data showing that participants sometimes change their minds after making perceptual decision, even though no more evidence is available (Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009; Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina, 2004; Yu et al., 2015) , support the view that evidence accumulation continues after Type I decision and therefore might be used for a subsequent confidence rating. There are also studies showing that choice itself can influence the level of confidence, although the interpretations of this effect differ (Kvam, Pleskac, Yu, & Busemeyer, 2015; Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer III, 1990) .
Independently of the issue whether Type I decision and metacognitive judgment are based on different amount of evidence, the less frequently asked question concerns whether they use the same source of information. A few recent studies on perception challenge the idea that only stimulus-related information influences the level of confidence. For example, Kiani and colleagues (Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014) have shown that deliberation time of Type I decision negatively correlates with certainty. The relation between confidence and decision time has been found before in number of tasks (e.g., Dougherty, Scheck, Nelson, & Narens, 2005; Koriat & Ma'ayan, 2005; Mealor & Dienes, 2013; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003) and was interpreted as reflecting the quality of stimulus or memory trace (e.g., Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) . However, having controlled stimulus strength, Kiani and colleagues (2014) found that decision time itself inversely influenced subjective confidence, probably as a learnt indicator of task difficulty. Other studies have shown that response-related motor activity and results of error monitoring could also be integrated into perceptual confidence. In the experiment on visual discrimination, participants' certainty in the preceding decision was lowered by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied to brain areas associated with motor response opposite to the response chosen by participant (Fleming, Maniscalco, Ko, Amendi, Ro, & Lau, 2015) . Boldt and Yeung (2015) have shown that the magnitude of error-related electroencephalography activity that is present after launching an erroneous Type I response was negatively related to the level of confidence in the preceding perceptual decision.
To further investigate the issue of sources of information underlying metacognitive judgment, we studied whether Type I response could alter metacognitive accuracy (Wierzchoń et al., 2014) . In this experiment participants decided whether a backward masked photograph presented a male or female face. Additionally, they gave metacognitive reports using one of four different scales (including CR and PAS), either immediately before or after Type I response. Although the accuracy of Type I performance did not differ between conditions, the relation between metacognitive judgments and the accuracy of Type I response was stronger when the judgment followed discrimination. Therefore, postdecisional metacognitive judgments were more accurate than the predecisional ones. A similar effect was found in an anagram-solving task in which participants assessed their confidence either before or after deciding whether a presented word was an anagram solution (Siedlecka et al., 2016) . In the light of the previously mentioned experiments, we interpret these results as showing that metacognitive judgments are informed by additional sources of information provided by executing a Type I response, such as processing time (Kiani et al., 2014) , response-related motor activity (Fleming et al., 2015) or internal accuracy feedback (Boldt & Yeung, 2015) .
Although the issue of information fed to the metacognitive judgment seems crucial for understanding the mechanisms of metacognition, there are hardly any studies directly comparing prospective and retrospective metacognitive judgments. This lacuna is quite striking especially as in consciousness research metacognitive judgments are collected before, after or together with Type I decision without taking into consideration possible effect of Type I response on subjective report (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007; Del Cul et al., 2009; Jachs, Blanco, GranthamHill, & Soto, 2015; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013) . Also, in some procedures used to study memory awareness (e.g., remember-know procedure; Tulving, 1985) , metacognitive judgment preceding Type I decision is measured after that decision has been overtly made (Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & Dean, 2006; Mealor & Dienes, 2013) . For example, after participants decide whether a presented item was included in the previously studied list, they retrospect whether the decision was based on conscious recollection of an item or on feeling of familiarity toward it (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2006) . Similarly, when retrospective and prospective judgments are measured in memory studies, the latter are reported after This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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retrieval attempts (Dougherty et al., 2005; Schnyer, Verfaellie, Alexander, LaFleche, Nicholls, & Kaszniak, 2004) . In order to propose a general mechanism underlying metacognitive judgments one needs to integrate data from studies using different types of content. There have been a few attempts to compare the accuracy and neural correlates of metacognitive judgments in perceptual and memory domains, but the results are not clear-cut. For example, although in some experiments metacognitive accuracy did not differ between perceptual and memory tasks (McCurdy et al., 2013 , but see: Baird et al., 2013 , it seemed to have distinct neural substrates in each domain (Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013) . Following the quest for understanding universal mechanisms of metacognitive awareness we present a set of experiments aiming to test the influence of a Type I response on metacognitive accuracy in tasks that involve memory. We designed experiments that were procedurally similar to the perceptual task used by Wierzchoń and colleagues (2014) in that participants rated their metacognition either before or after a twoalternative forced choice Type I task.
We conducted two experiments to compare metacognitive accuracy between conditions in which confidence ratings directly followed or preceded a Type I response. Each experiment contained the two conditions, but they differed in respect to Type I task. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to decide which of the two target words had been presented previously. In Experiment 2, participants responded whether a target word had been presented before. The experimental procedures allowed for varying amounts of decision-related information to be available to participants before they reported their confidence. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether confidence ratings given after a decision were more accurate than when given before a decision. In this experiment, participants either responded first to the target words ("which of the two words has been presented before?") and then rated confidence in that response, or, in the second condition, they were asked to rate their confidence in a subsequent response before even seeing the target words (they were presented only with a cue: the first letter of the word to recall). This procedure allowed us to create conditions that differed in the presence of Type I decisions, as it prevented participants in the second condition from deciding between the two target words prior to confidence rating. However, as a result, the two conditions differed also in respect to the memory process (recognition and recall) preceding the metacognitive judgment. Therefore, in Experiment 2 the target word was always presented at the beginning of the trial and conditions differed only in the presence of a Type I (motor) response before confidence rating.
We expected that metacognitive accuracy would be higher for confidence ratings given after a Type I decision and after a Type I response; this would support the view that carrying out a Type I response provides additional information to that already available at the time of that response. This additional information processing might also be inferred from temporal characteristics of response and confidence rating. As metacognitive judgment is at least partially based on the same evidence as Type I responses (i.e., memory trace strength), we expected that reaction time (RT) in a memory task would be negatively correlated with the level of confidence (Dougherty et al., 2005; Mealor & Dienes, 2013; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) . This relation, however, should be stronger in the case of ratings given after Type I responses, as they could be informed by the amount of time used to respond. Additionally, we hypothesized that the time it takes to give confidence rating would be negatively correlated with the level of confidence (Hilgenstock et al., 2014; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003) .
We also investigated the relation between the timing of metacognitive judgment and metacognitive accuracy. There are two ways in which the duration of assessing confidence could relate to metacognitive accuracy. On one hand, some researchers suggest that task difficulty affects metacognition (Galvin et al., 2003) ; therefore, if rating time reflects the difficulty of forming a metacognitive judgment, the later the metacognitive rating, the lower the metacognitive accuracy should be in both conditions. Alternatively, we could expect a positive correlation between metacognitive accuracy and postdecisional confidence judgment time, which would reflect the time needed to integrate additional information from different sources, such as decision time or results of error monitoring (e.g., Yu et al., 2015) .
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to assess whether the order of Type I decision and confidence rating influences metacognitive accuracy.
Method
Participants. Thirty-eight volunteers (27 women) aged 18 -30 (M ϭ 22.47, SD ϭ 2.63) took part in the experiment in return for a small payment (about 10 PLN, an equivalent of 4 $). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to participation in the study. The protocol for all experiments was approved by an institutional ethical board and was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials. The experiment was run on PC computers using E-Prime (Version 2.0). The stimuli were 240 Polish six-to-eight letter words (maximum three syllables) chosen from a subtitlebased frequency list (Mandera, Keuleers, Wodniecka, & Brysbaert, 2015) . Because the participants' task was to decide which of the two words had appeared on the list (McCurdy et al., 2013) , two alternative versions of the word lists were created. Therefore, each word could be an "old" or "new" word, depending on the list presented to a given participant. Each of the six lists contained 20 words, each starting with a different letter. The confidence scale was associated with either the question "How confident are you that you will make the right decision?", or "How confident are you that you made the right decision?" The alternatives were "I am guessing", "I am not confident", "I am quite confident", and "I am very confident" (Dienes & Perner, 2004) .
Procedure. The experiment took place in a computer laboratory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that differed in respect to the task order: either the response to the target words (Type I) preceded the confidence rating (R-CR, response-confidence rating), or the confidence rating preceded the word-related response (CR-R, confidence rating-response). There were 6 experimental blocks, each started with a list of words presented at the center of the screen for 20 s and was followed by a distracting task consisting of 6 algebra equations, to which This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
714 participants responded by typing the outcome number. Twenty experimental trials followed, each starting with a cue presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms, being the first letter of a two subsequently presented words. Then participants either performed the Type I task or rated their confidence. During the Type I task two words, starting with the same letter, were presented on the left and right side of the screen. Participants were asked to decide which word was presented on the previously studied list using keys 1 and 2 (with "L" and "R" stickers) on the numeric keyboard with their right hand. In the confidence rating task, participants were asked to assess their confidence in choosing the right word. Participants used keys 1, 2, 3, 4 on the keyboard with their left hand. The time available for both, response in Type I task and confidence rating was 5 s. After each trial a blank screen was presented for 1 s. At the beginning of the procedure, participants were presented with one training list with five words and five subsequent recognition trials. The procedure is presented on Figure 1 (Part A).
Data Analysis
Metacognitive accuracy was operationalized as the relationship between Type I performance and confidence rating (Norman et al., 2011; Sandberg et al., 2010) , and precisely as the extent to which confidence ratings predict Type I response accuracy. This relation was analyzed using logistic regression, which is the correct model for predicting binary outcomes (Norman & Price, 2015) . Logistic regression has important advantages over popular approaches based on signal detection theory: (1) The mixed model framework allows us to answer several statistical questions and to control for the random effect of subjects and stimuli in the context of a single comprehensive analysis; (2) mixed models tolerate unbalanced designs and relatively small trial numbers; (3) logistic regression is not based on the assumption that the information available for the metacognitive judgment is a function only of the information available for the Type I decision.
The mixed logistic regression models were fitted using the lme4 package in the R Statistical Environment (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; R Core Team, 2015) using standard (0/1) contrast coding. In Experiment 1, our main model included the following fixed effects: confidence rating (four levels), order (two levels), their interactions, as well as the random effects of participantspecific intercept, word, and slope. CRs were centered on the lowest value ("guessing") and the basic condition was the postde- Figure 1 . Procedure of the task in Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). Conditions: R-CR: response followed by confidence rating, CR-R: confidence rating followed by response. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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cisional CR (R-CR). Therefore, the regression slope reflects the relation between Type I task accuracy and confidence rating (metacognitive accuracy) while the intercept informs about performance level when participants report guessing. Statistical significance was assessed with the Wald test. The data were not analyzed prior to completion of the collecting stage.
Results
Two participants' data were excluded from analysis, one due to poor performance (34% accuracy) and one whose variance of scale usage (the number of scale points used) was three standard deviations below average. Next, we removed 44 omitted trials. We found no differences between conditions neither in the Type I task accuracy (z ϭ Ϫ0.94, p ϭ .35) nor with respect to the response bias (z ϭ 1.67, p ϭ .09). The general descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 . The frequency with which participants used each scale point and the average accuracy for each scale point are presented on Figure 2 .
To analyze the effect of decision-confidence rating order on metacognitive accuracy (i.e., the relation between Type I accuracy and confidence rating) we fitted a mixed logistic regression model defined above. The results are presented in Table 3 . The first line (intercept) represents Type I response accuracy in the baseline condition (R-CR, lowest rating ϭ "guessing") on the logit scale; so the nonsignificant intercept indicates that when participants claimed they were guessing, their response accuracy did not differ significantly from chance level. The second coefficient estimates the difference between conditions (R-CR and CR-R) in average accuracy for the lowest scale point. This difference is statistically significant and shows that, when reporting guessing, participants in CR-R performed the memory task with higher accuracy than in R-CR. The third line estimates the relationship between confidence and accuracy (in R-CR, this relationship is statistically significant). The last coefficient estimates the effect of condition on the confidence rating slopes. The relationship between confidence and accuracy was weaker in the CR-R condition than in the R-CR condition. Additionally, we analyzed the relation between confidence and accuracy within CR-R, which was also statistically significant (z ϭ 2.23, p ϭ .02).
The observed advantage of R-CR in metacognitive accuracy over CR-R could be attributed to the difference in the amount of time available for making metacognitive judgments (the time between the presentation of a letter cue and confidence rating). To investigate this possibility, we created a new variable, CR time, which in the case of R-CR was equal to the sum of Type I response RT and confidence rating RT, and in CR-R was equal to confidence rating RT. We did not find statistically significant relationship between CR time and metacognitive accuracy in either condition (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ1.81, p ϭ .07, CR-R: z ϭ 0.7, p ϭ .49).
Last, to explore between-condition differences in relations between type 1 accuracy, confidence level and temporal characteristics of both, we performed a series of analyses using mixed logistic regression models (dependent variable: accuracy) and linear mixed models (dependent variable: confidence rating). Participants chose the correct word quicker in both conditions (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ12.29, p Ͻ .001; CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ9.73, p Ͻ .001), and we found no differences in the strength of this relationship between conditions (z ϭ 0.87, p ϭ .38). Shorter Type I response RT was associated with higher confidence in R-CR (z ϭ Ϫ26.68, p Ͻ .001), but we did not find such relation in CR-R (z ϭ Ϫ1.79, p ϭ .08). The difference between the conditions was statistically significant (z ϭ 4.13, p Ͻ .001). Similarly, when participants rated their confidence after Type I response, their metacognition was more accurate when the Type I response RT was shorter (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ4.45, p Ͻ .001). When confidence was rated before the response, we found no relation between RT and metacognitive accuracy (CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ.66, p ϭ .51). Additionally, the confidence RT correlated with the reported confidence level in both conditions (the longer confidence RT the lower confidence, R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ11.72, p Ͻ .001, CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ2.62, p ϭ .01) although the relationship was significantly stronger in R-CR (z ϭ 8.23, p Ͻ .001). However, we did not find a relation between confidence RT and metacognitive accuracy in either condition (R-CR: z ϭ .55, p ϭ .58, CR-R: z ϭ .86, p ϭ .39).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 replicated the main finding from the visual awareness study (Wierzchoń et al., 2014) showing that metacognitive judgments are more accurate when measured after Type I response. The relation between confidence level and Type I accuracy was significantly stronger in R-CR condition. The effect could not be explained neither by the difference in difficulty between the two conditions nor by the amount of time available for metacognitive judgment. The comparison of average accuracy for the lowest scale point showed that participants in CR-R, when claiming that they would be guessing, actually performed better than in the R-CR condition (in which the accuracy did not differ significantly from chance level). The requirement of assessing one's confidence in future decision probably yields to a more cautious strategy than in situation when confidence about past Note. R-CR ϭ response-confidence rating; CR-R ϭ confidence rating-response. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
716 decision is assessed. Although in CR-R the "guessing" rating was not chosen more often that other scale points we can see that participants used middle scale points more often than the highest and the lowest end of the scale. On the contrary participants in R-CR used the highest scale points most often.
The analysis of the relation between Type I RT, confidence rating RT and confidence level replicated some previous findings but also showed further differences between conditions. The relation between Type I RT and the level of confidence as well as metacognitive accuracy suggests that information used for Type I Note. R-CR ϭ response-confidence rating; CR-R ϭ confidence rating-response. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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RESPONSES IMPROVE CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS decision influences also confidence rating (Dougherty et al., 2005; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) as Type I RT is usually interpreted as reflecting the quality of evidence (e.g., memory strength, Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) . However, as expected, this relation was significantly stronger in R-CR condition. Therefore, the response time in Type I task could inform confidence rating -for example, via a heuristic that response time reflects task difficulty (Kiani et al., 2014) . The negative relation between the latency of confidence rating and the level of confidence has been found previously in perceptual and memory studies (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2006; Mealor & Dienes, 2013; Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Yu et al., 2015) , and suggests that confidence is processed, at least partially, separately from Type I response (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) . Conditions differed in terms of those relationships: it was stronger in R-CR. Those results probably stem from the fact that in CR-R Condition CR RT and Type I RT are partly overlapping (CR RT includes the time of attempting to access the word).
Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to assess whether the order of Type I response and confidence rating influences metacognitive accuracy. The results of Experiment 1 supports the hypothesis that Type I decision can influence metacognitive accuracy. However, one difficulty with interpreting the results is that participants in the CR-R condition were not presented with the two target words before rating their confidence. This procedure was necessary to minimize the chance of participants making an actual decision before confidence rating in CR-R condition. Although in Experiment 1 we found no difference in Type I accuracy or bias (proportion of "left" or "right" responses) between the conditions, it is possible that the discrepancies in metacognitive accuracy stemmed from the difference between processes leading to Type I response. For example, participants recognized a word in the R-CR condition but had to recall it before reporting confidence in CR-R. Although postdecisional ratings could be based on the outcome of word recognition, the predecisional metacognition could have been informed by a recall attempt following the letter cue.
In Experiment 2 participants were always presented with a target word before being asked for a Type I response or confidence rating, and therefore performed the same recognition task in both conditions. This procedure helped us to avoid aforementioned problems, but allowed participants to make their world-related decision before rating confidence also in the condition in which the rating preceded the Type I response.
Method
Participants. Fifty-five volunteers (eight males) aged 19 to 30 (M ϭ 20.31, SD ϭ 1.64), took part in the experiment in return for a small payment (about 10 PLN, an equivalent of 2.5 EUR). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to participation in the study.
Materials. Materials were the same as in Experiment 1. Procedure. The general procedure was similar to the one used in Experiment 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that differed with respect to the Type 1 response and confidence rating order. Contrary to the previous experiment, here the target word was always presented before word-related response and confidence rating were required. Participants were presented with just one target word and then asked to answer whether it had been previously presented on the list. We changed this detail so that participants did not have to keep two words and their locations (left or right) in memory until the moment of response. The letter cue was replaced with a fixation point and the target word was presented for 500 ms. Also, the time available for responses was decreased to 3 s. The procedure is presented in Figure 1 (Part B).
Results
None of the participants were excluded from analysis due to poor performance or low variance of scale usage. We removed 107 omitted trials. We did not find significant differences between conditions in Type I task accuracy (z ϭ Ϫ1.09, p ϭ .29), nor with Note. R-CR ϭ response-confidence rating; CR-R ϭ confidence rating-response. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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respect to response bias (z ϭ Ϫ0.56, p ϭ .57). The general descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 . The frequency with which participants used each scale point and the average accuracy for each scale point are presented on Figure 3 . Similarly to the model used in Experiment 1, the first line in Table 6 (intercept) describes the difference (on the logit scale) between accuracy and chance level in the baseline condition (Order R-CR, lowest rating ϭ "guessing"). The second coefficient estimates the difference between conditions (R-CR and CR-R) in average accuracy for the lowest rating ("guessing"). We did not find such a difference between conditions. The third line estimates the relationship between confidence rating and accuracy (in the baseline condition, R-CR). This relationship is statistically significant. The last coefficient estimates the effect of condition on the confidence rating slopes. Confidence ratings were less strongly related to accuracy when given before a Type I response (the test was two-tailed, therefore for the directional hypothesis that we were testing, p ϭ .029). Additionally, we calculated the correlation between confidence ratings and accuracy within the CR-R condition; it was statistically significant (z ϭ 10.19, p Ͻ .001).
Because the observed advantage of R-CR over CR-R in metacognitive accuracy could be attributed to the difference in the Note. R-CR ϭ response-confidence rating; CR-R ϭ confidence rating-response.
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RESPONSES IMPROVE CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS amount of time available for giving a confidence rating, we created a variable called CR time: in condition CR-R it equaled confidence rating RT and in condition R-CR it equaled Type I RT plus confidence rating RT. We found a statistically significant relation between CR time and metacognitive accuracy (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ2.83, p ϭ .005. CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ2.43, p ϭ .02): the later the confidence rating was given, the lower the metacognitive accuracy was. We did not find a significant difference in the strength of this relationship between the two conditions (z ϭ 0.13, p ϭ .9).
To explore the differences in the relation between Type I response accuracy, confidence rating, and the temporal characteristics of both, we performed a series of analyses using mixed logistic regression models (dependent variable: accuracy) and linear mixed models (dependent variable: confidence rating). Participants chose the correct word more quickly in both conditions (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ7.04, p Ͻ .001; CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ5.38, p Ͻ .001) and we found no differences between conditions (z ϭ 0.4, p ϭ .69). Shorter Type I response RT was associated with higher confidence in R-CR (z ϭ Ϫ8.81, p Ͻ .001) and in CR-R (z ϭ Ϫ10.31, p Ͻ .001). We did not observe a significant difference between the conditions in the strength of this relationship (z ϭ Ϫ1.54, p Ͻ .13). Similarly, the quicker the Type I response, the more accurate the metacognition in both conditions (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ3.33, p Ͻ .001, CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ3.12, p ϭ .001). We found no significant difference between the conditions (z ϭ Ϫ0.55, p ϭ .58). Lastly, the longer the confidence RT, the lower the confidence level in both conditions (R-CR: z ϭ Ϫ6.69, p Ͻ .001, CR-R: z ϭ Ϫ6.1, p Ͻ .001, no significant difference between conditions: z ϭ 0.88, p Ͻ .39). Although we found no significant relationship between confidence RT and metacognitive accuracy in R-CR (z ϭ Ϫ1.1, p ϭ .27), in the CR-R condition the confidence ratings that were given later were associated with lower metacognitive accuracy (z ϭ Ϫ2.37, p ϭ .02).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated the main finding from Experiment 1, showing that metacognitive accuracy is higher when metacognitive judgment follows Type I response. The effect was smaller than in the previous experiment, suggesting, that in Experiment 1 the observed difference in metacognitive accuracy could have been enlarged by the differences in the amount of decision-related information available before confidence rating (recognition in R-CR vs. recall in CR-R condition). The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the presence of Type I response before metacognitive judgment increases metacognitive accuracy, even though a Type I decision could have been made before confidence rating. Interestingly, the time of confidence judgment (measured from the beginning of a trial) was related to the metacognitive accuracy, but in a way that could not explain our main effect. Specifically, the later the confidence rating, the lower the metacognitive accuracy in both conditions.
Contrary to Experiment 1, we found no differences between conditions in Type I accuracy level for the lowest scale rating ("guessing"). Also, the frequency of the chosen scale points was similar in both conditions. This supports our interpretation of the results of the previous experiment. When participants were asked to rate their confidence in their future decision when there was limited data (they had not seen the target words yet), they engaged a more careful strategy compared to the condition in which they knew the target words before assessing the confidence of their subsequent decision.
The analysis of the relation between Type I response RT, confidence rating RT and confidence level showed further differences between the experiments. Contrary to Experiment 1, we found a relation between Type I response RT and the level of confidence and a relation between Type I response RT and metacognitive accuracy in both conditions. Therefore, presenting target words at the beginning of trials might have diminished the differences between conditions. After seeing the word participants might have attempted to make their Type I decisions and probably got some sense of trial difficulty, experiencing fluency or item familiarity (Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Koriat & Ma'ayan, 2005) . It has been shown that prejudgement retrieval fluency (that is, its latency and success) correlates with metacognitive judgments about past and future memory performance (Dougherty et al., 2005; Matvey, Dunlosky, & Guttentag, 2001; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993) .
Similarly to Experiment 1, confidence rating RT was negatively related to the confidence level in both conditions, which again supports the hypothesis that confidence is processed, at least partially, separately from Type I responses (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Yu et al., 2015) . Also, similarly to the Experiment 1, we did not observe a significant relationship between confidence rating RTs and metacognitive accuracy in the R-CR condition, although we found a negative relationship in CR-R. Therefore we are not able to determine whether the time taken to judge postdecisional confidence is associated with the difficulty of processing confidence (decreased metacognitive accuracy for longer confidence RTs) or with integrating additional information (increased metacognitive accuracy for longer confidence RTs). This is interesting in the context of studies showing that increasing the time between decision and confidence rating improves confidence resolution (the degree to which confidence judgments discriminate between correct and incorrect choices, Yu et al., 2015) . In the study of Yu and colleagues (2015) , participants were prompted to rate their confidence at given moments; when the postdecisional time increased, the confidence in incorrect decisions decreased. It seems that when a state of confidence in each time interval is measured it might reflect additional information integrated from the error-monitoring system. On the other hand, when participants are free to choose the moment of rating (within a time limit, as in This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
720 our experiments), the process becomes more noisy and contaminated with other processes (e.g., an evidence searching strategy), therefore it becomes difficult to determine its relation to the accuracy.
General Discussion
The main finding of the presented experiments is that metacognitive assessments are more accurate when given after rather than before Type I decision. Metacognitive accuracy does not improve with time therefore the effect could not be explained away only by the difference in interval between letter cue and confidence rating. The data also showed that the level of confidence correlates not only with Type I response time but also with the time of the rating itself. The findings are consistent across the two experiments, even though the procedures differed in a several ways. In Experiment 1 participants performed different Type I tasks in each condition (recognition in R-CR and recall in CR-R) while in Experiment 2 the same recognition task was used in both conditions. Also, in Experiment 1 participants saw a target and could make their Type I decision before confidence judgment only in the R-CR condition; in Experiment 2 the target was always presented before Type I response and confidence rating, therefore conditions differed only in the order of these two responses. Together with data on the relation between the level of confidence and temporal characteristics of Type I response and confidence rating, our results suggest that metacognitive judgments are based on information integrated from multiple sources; this could include external cues, that is, those available in the task itself, or internal cues such as memory trace strength, decision and response given by a participant. The outcome of the experiments also support the view that processes underlying subjective ratings are universal, as the influence of response on metacognitive accuracy was also found in a perceptual study (Wierzchoń at al, 2014 ) and problem-solving task (Siedlecka et al., 2016) .
The results interpreted in the context of confidence models support the hypothesis that metacognitive reports are based on different amount of information than available at the time of Type I response (Graziano, Parra, & Sigman, 2015; Hilgenstock et al., 2014; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) . Although those models apply to postdecisional confidence, the results showing the difference between post and predecisional and post and preresponse confidence ratings stand against single information-collection stage theories (Vickers & Lee, 1998; Higham et al., 2009) . Assuming that confidence is set at the time of a Type I decision, one could expect larger latency of confidence rating in the CR-R condition because of the inclusion of both the attempt to recall/recognize the word and the confidence processing time; however, the correlation between confidence and Type I accuracy should be equally strong in both conditions. This was not the case in our study. Moreover, we found negative correlations between confidence rating RT and the level of confidence, usually interpreted as indicating a separate stage of evidence accumulation (Hilgenstock et al., 2014; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003) .
The data from our experiments also suggest that metacognitive judgments are based on information integrated from different sources. Although, our study was not designed to directly identify those sources, the data indicates that they include Type I decision and response characteristics. The analysis of RTs has shown that delayed Type I responses were associated with a lower level of metacognitive awareness (in Experiment 1 only for postdecisional confidence rating). Since response time is thought to be an index of task difficulty (e.g., Wixted & Mickes, 2010) , this result is in line with data showing that the ease or success of the word retrieval attempt (Dougherty et al., 2005; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat & Ma'ayan, 2005) and the duration of actual decision (Kiani et al., 2014) informs metacognitive judgment. Similarly, the aforementioned studies on response-related activity of the premotor cortex (Fleming et al., 2015) , results of response-related error monitoring (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000) and interceptive feedback (Wessel, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2011) point to the interpretation that response-related characteristics are a crucial source of information for metacognitive assessment. Interestingly, Fleming and Daw (2017) have recently proposed a second-order model of metacognition in which one's own actions contribute to confidence reports (Fleming & Daw, 2017) . The predictions of the model were compared to data from our experiment on an anagram task (Siedlecka et al., 2016) which displayed similar patterns.
Considering alternative explanations for the influence of type 1 decision and response on metacognitive accuracy we should mention studies showing the effect of choice on confidence calibration (understood as the probability of being correct that people assign to their answers, relative to the actual proportion correct, Kvam et al., 2015; Sniezek et al., 1990) . For example, the quantum confidence model assumes that when a decision is made the indefinite state of evidence changes into a definite choice state, reducing a person's uncertainty (Kvam et al., 2015) . The support for this model comes from experiments showing that participants are less overconfident in the condition in which Type I response precedes confidence rating compared to the condition in which participants simultaneously report both Type I decision and confidence (Kvam et al., 2015) . On the other hand, Sniezek and colleagues (1990) suggested that explicit choice reduces overconfidence due to more cognitive processing related to decision making. The data from our experiments are not in line with the results from the aforementioned studies: in Experiment 1 we actually observed underconfidence (above-chance performance level for "guessing") in the condition in which Type I decision followed confidence. This difference between the results might be yet another example of the importance of the sequential relation between Type I decision, response and confidence judgment. For example, when participants are asked to report decision and confidence on the same scale (i.e., "certain that A -certain that B"; Kvam et al., 2015) , although confidence does not follow Type I response, it is probably processed differently to a situation in which no decision was made prior to or simultaneously with confidence rating.
In future studies we should try to separate the decision itself and its motor execution in a single experiment. Although studies on perceptual confidence point to the role of neural activity related to motor response (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Fleming et al., 2015) , we cannot exclude the possibility that covert decisions also affect metacognitive accuracy. However, it is hard to address this issue experimentally. When participants are asked to make a decision without a response then to measure the relation between Type I accuracy and metacognitive judgment we have to trust them to remember and report the same decision afterward (after metacognitive judgment), even if they change their minds in the meantime. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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At the same time, it is difficult to design a condition in which participants carry out motor response to a task without making a decision first. One way to achieve this is to induce a task irrelevant motor reaction that might overlap with stimuli-related responses (Siedlecka et al., 2018) . To conclude, our results indicate that response in a memory task improves metacognitive assessment of related memory content. However, further research is needed to determine the mechanisms of metacognitive assessments and the factors influencing its accuracy. Also, the observed discrepancy between metacognitive accuracy for confidence rating given after and before Type I response adds to the empirical hurdles that confidence models should overcome (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Moran et al., 2015) . Apart from the theoretical implications, there are also some practical outcomes. We suggest that subjective reports proceeding and following Type I responses should not be used interchangeably.
